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ABSTRACT
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) developed the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA) to unify the laws regulating the
improper use of secret, economically advantageous
information. However, consumers often procure software
and other products without knowledge of any trade secrets
used in the production of the products. Some companies
have sought remedies against end users of products
developed using trade secrets. But in Silvaco Data Systems
v. Intel Corp., a California appeals court considering this
issue in the software context held that execution of
compiled object code, which is not easily interpreted by
humans, is not an improper use of trade secrets embedded
in the underlying, human-readable source code. This ruling
implies that end users of software, and perhaps other
products, are not liable for misappropriation of trade
secrets merely through use of the end products. This Article
surveys the application of the UTSA to software and
explains why this holding is a proper reading of the Act’s
scope. In addition, this Article discusses the public policies
behind this limitation on liability for end users and possible
implications of the Silvaco ruling beyond software.
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INTRODUCTION
Liability attaches when one improperly uses the trade secrets of
another. 1 However, it is sometimes difficult to determine what
actions constitute the use of a trade secret. For instance, can the use
of a commercial product, such as software, developed with the
stolen trade secrets of another, rise to improper use? Strong
statutory construction and public policy arguments exist to limit
the liability of such secondary users.
Today, the statutory language governing trade secret law is
mostly uniform across the states. 2 However, courts have arrived at
conflicting answers regarding the liability of end users of products
developed with trade secrets. State common law traditionally
governed trade secrets,3 but since the introduction of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), most states have implemented statutes
consistent with either the 1979 or 1985 versions of this uniform
law. Even so, courts have varied in their application of the UTSA
to determine a party’s misappropriation liability when that party
1

1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 1.01 (2010).
1-1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 1.01[2][b]
(2010) (most states have adopted trade secret laws consistent with either the
UTSA (1979) or the UTSA (1985)).
3
1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAW, § 2.3 (2010).
2
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develops a product using trade secret information.
In Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp, 4 a California appellate
court applied the UTSA to limit the liability of a party that used
commercial software developed with stolen trade secrets. The
court held, “One does not, by executing machine-readable
software, ‘use’ the underlying source code; nor does one acquire
the requisite knowledge of any trade secrets embodied in that
code.”5 This holding is in direct conflict with ClearOne
Communications Inc., v. Chiang,6 a prior opinion by a Federal
District Court interpreting the UTSA in Utah. 7
The question of improper use is critical to users of software
and other commercial products. Many products are developed by
employing various technologies, some of which are protected by
patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. Users often obtain products
in the stream of commerce without knowledge of any underlying
intellectual property. Even the most diligent users cannot readily
discover if all the required intellectual property assignments and
licenses are properly in place to avoid infringement or
misappropriation.
This Article discusses the UTSA and the unique complexities
of its application to software. In addition, this Article explains why
the holding in Silvaco—that the UTSA does not attach liability to
the use of a product that was developed with trade secrets—is the
proper reading of the model code’s scope. Finally, this Article
discusses the public policy reasons behind this limitation and
possible implications beyond the software industry.

4

Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 109 Cal. Rptr.
3d. 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
5
Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 216.
6
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang, No. 2:07-cv-37 TC, 2007 WL
4376125 (D. Utah Dec. 13, 2007).
7
The ClearOne case was recently affirmed by the Tenth Circuit (ClearOne
Communications, Inc. v. Bowers, 643 F. 3d 735 (10th. Cir. 2011)). However, the
issues considered on appeal were unrelated to the issues that are in conflict with
the holdings of the Silvaco case. Thus, the Tenth Circuit’s opinion does not
address the conflict between the holdings of Silvaco and ClearOne.
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I. TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE UTSA
Like copyright law, trade secret law does not extend protection
to ideas. 8 Trade secret protection instead covers information or
facts. 9 As opposed to patent and copyright law, which require
public disclosure, trade secret law protects information and
requires the trade secret owner to undergo steps to keep the
information secret.
Another way in which trade secrets are distinct from other
areas of intellectual property is that federal law does not apply.
Trade secret protection is under the governance of the states.
During the twentieth century, as the importance of trade secrets to
the national economy increased, the states’ case law diverged.
In an effort to unify trade secret law across the states, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
(NCCUSL) drafted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) and
promulgated the model code in 1979. The NCCUSL amended the
UTSA in 1985. By 2009, 46 states had adopted the UTSA. 10 In
8

Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 220.
“Trade secret law does not protect ideas as such. Indeed a trade secret may
consist of something we would not ordinarily consider an idea (a conceptual
datum) at all, but more a fact (an empirical datum).” Id. (emphasis omitted).
10
ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (2011); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910 to
45.50.945 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 44-401 to 44-407 (2011); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to 4-75-607 (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426 to 3426.11
(2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to 7-74-110 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 35-50 to 35-58 (2011); D.C. CODE, §§ 36-401 to 36-410 (1981); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§2001 to 2009 (2011); FLA. STAT. §§ 688.001 TO 688.009 (2011);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-767 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 484B-1
to 482B-9 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-801 to 48-807 (2011); 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. §§ 1065/1 to 1065/9 (2011); IND. CODE §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8
(2011); IOWA CODE §§ 550.1 to 550.8 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3330 to
60-3330 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880 to 365.900 (2011); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431 to 51.1439 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1541 to
1548 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1201 to 11-1209; MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 445.1901 to 445.1910; MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01 to 325C.08 (2011);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19; V.A.M.S. §§ 417.450–417.467
(1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to 30-14-409 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 87-501 to 87-507 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 600A.010 to 600A.100 (2011);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:1 to 350-B:9; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to
57-3A-7 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to 66-158 (2011); N.D. CENT.
9
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2010, the Massachusetts and New Jersey legislatures introduced
the act for adoption. 11 The only states that have not expressed
intent to adopt the UTSA are New York and Texas. 12
Section 1(4) of the UTSA defines a trade secret as
“information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process.” 13 This definition places
limitations on what is protectable, namely that a trade secret must
be information. Section 1(4)(i) and 1(4)(ii) place further limitations
on the definition of a trade secret: the information must have
“economic value,” must “not be generally known,” must not be
“readily ascertainable by proper means,” and must be “the subject
of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.” 14
Section 1(2) of the UTSA attaches misappropriation liability to
one who “improperly acquires, discloses, or uses another’s trade
secrets.” 15 The Act “does not define these terms, but leaves their
delineation to be adjudicated in the light of the purposes and
provisions of the act.” 16 The Act does list five actionable varieties
of use, four of which clearly require the user to have “knowledge
of the trade secret” while “[t]he fifth is arguably ambiguous on this
point.” 17
CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to 47-25.1-08 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61–
69 (2011); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 78, §§ 85 to 95 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461
to 646.475 (2011); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301–5308 (2011); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to 6-41-11 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-1 to 39-8-9 (2011);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-29-1 to 37-29-11 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47–
25–1701 to 47–25–1709 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to 13-24-9
(2011); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, §§ 4601 to 4609, and TIT. § 523; VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 59.1-336 to 59.1-343 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010 to
19.108.940 (2011); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to 47-22-10 (2011); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 134.90 (2011); and WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-24-101 to 40-24-11 (2011).
The varying effective dates of these laws are set forth in Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, 14 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 537.
11
Trade Secrets Act, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
12
Id.
13
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).
14
U.T.S.A. § 1(4) (1985).
15
U.T.S.A. § 1(2) (1985).
16
Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 222.
17
Id. at 224.
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II. THE UTSA AS APPLIED TO SOFTWARE PRIOR TO SILVACO
Legal analysis of trade secret problems in the software context
draws a critical distinction between two types of computer code:
“source code” and “object code.” When developing software,
programmers often describe the underlying logic in a high-level
language such as C or FORTRAN. This set of human-readable
instructions is referred to as “source code.” Many of these highlevel languages are not directly executable by computer hardware,
but must first be transformed into a machine language—also
known as object code, executable code, or binary code. Specialized
software tools perform this translation and optimize the resulting
object code via a process known as “compiling.” The resulting
object code is in a binary format and not readable by humans. The
reverse process, decompiling, or translating object code into
human readable source code, is difficult and imperfect in practice.
As the complexity of a software design increases, the difficulty of
successfully decompiling the source code increases dramatically.
Thus, distributing software in an object code format does not
typically disclose the underlying design to the end user.
Courts have long held that software, in the form of source
code, can contain information protected by trade secret law. 18
Courts have also recognized the disclosure distinctions inherent in
the distribution 19 of software as source code versus as object
code.20 The distribution of object code might not disclose any trade
secrets that are embedded in the source code from which it was
compiled because object code does not disclose the details of the
18

See Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp.
258 (N.D. Okl. 1978); Q-Co Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.
N.Y. 1985); and Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp.
340 (D. Mass. 1993).
19
It is common practice in the software industry to distribute software in
compiled, executable form only. One advantage to this practice is that the user
has no access to the source code and thus, any embedded trade secrets remain
secret.
20
2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAW, 9. Secret Protection for
Computer Technology, III. Computer Source Codes Versus Object Codes,
§ 9:11 (October 2010).
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underlying design. Even if the source code contains information
subject to trade secrecy protection, this embedded information
remains secret.
Software, like many commercial products, often involves the
integration of various independent technologies. These
technologies are potentially protectable by various forms of
intellectual property law and owned by disparate parties. Because
end users often lack specific knowledge of the intellectual property
used in application development, most software distributed through
commercial channels is essentially a “black box.”
Parties whose trade secrets are incorporated into source code
that is later compiled and released as object code constituting
software may desire remedies against third-party users of the
software. However, whether the law extends trade secret protection
to object code compiled from protected source code remained
unsettled prior to the Silvaco decision. In the words of one preSilvaco commentator:
If an object code represents secret novel and
valuable information, its misappropriation in breach
of confidence should be actionable. Cases involving
the theft of object codes are rare, so that extension
of trade secrets protection to object codes is
supported more by logic and reason than by
common law precedent. 21
Two post-UTSA cases considered this issue. ClearOne
Communications, Inc. v. Chiang, 22 discussed infra Section III(B),
relied heavily on case law from non-UTSA jurisdictions. In
McCormack Dodge Corp. v. ABC Management Systems Inc., a
Washington state court took an expansive view of which assets are
considered information eligible for protection. The court held that
the software at issue included “(1) the source code . . . ; (2) the
object code derived from the source code; (3) any flow charts
and/or underlying algorithms derivable from the source code; and

21

See JAGER, supra note 21, at 4.
ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang, No. 2:07-cv-37 TC, 2007 WL
4376125 (D. Utah Dec. 13, 2007).
22
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(4) user manual, operations manual and installation manual.” 23 In
applying the UTSA, the court ruled that all the above components
are protectable under trade secret law. 24
In a pre-UTSA case, Computer Print Systems, Inc. v. Lewis, a
court held an act of stealing object code to be a misappropriation of
trade secrets.25 There is an important factual distinction between
this case and both Silvaco and ClearOne. The defendant in
Computer Print breached a duty of confidence and stole the object
code from the plaintiff. In both Silvaco and ClearOne, the
defendant obtained the object code from a third party.
III. THE SILVACO DECISION AND ITS REASONING
In April 2010, the California Court of Appeals in Silvaco
considered the whether an unknowing end user of software is liable
for misappropriation of trade secrets.26 The defendant-appellee,
Intel, obtained circuit simulation software in the form of object
code from a third-party vendor, CSI. 27 Aided by two former
Silvaco employees, CSI had stolen trade secrets in the form of
source code from the plaintiff-appellant, Silvaco.28 CSI then
developed the compiled software product and delivered it to
Intel. 29 In a prior proceeding, Silvaco had obtained a
misappropriation judgment against CSI.30
Silvaco asserted that, under the California Uniform Trade
Secret Act (CUTSA), Intel had also misappropriated its trade
secrets. 31 Silvaco argued that: (1) “executable code incorporates
the same ‘information’ as the source code from which it is
23

McCormack Dodge Corp. v. ABC Management Systems, Inc. 222
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 432, 433 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1983).
24
Id. at 444.
25
Computer Print Systems, Inc. v. Lewis, 821 Pa. Super. 240, 422 A.2d
148, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 626 (1980).
26
Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 3d. 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
27
Id. at 216.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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compiled, so that executing it on a computer constitutes ‘use’ of
any trade secrets reflected in the source code”; 32 (2) “apart from
the informational content of the source code, the secrets claimed
by it include certain ‘methods, techniques, and algorithms’ that
were ‘contain[ed]’ and ‘use[d]’ in the executable code” 33; and (3)
that liability under CUTSA does not require comprehension of the
trade secret. 34
In response, Intel claimed that: (1) “it never possessed the
source code identified by Silvaco as constituting and containing its
trade secrets, but only executable code supplied by CSI”; 35 and (2)
“the possession and use of [the software] in the form of executable
object code or binary code could not impart knowledge of any
trade secrets embodied in the source code.” 36
The trial court recognized a difference between the source code
and object code versions of the software. Because source code is
merely the information that communicates or enables the
functionality and design of the software,
[B]y acquiring the CSI software that ‘embodies’
Silvaco’s source code, Intel did not acquire, or gain
knowledge of, the information that constitutes
Silvaco’s alleged trade secret . . . . It is not the
functionality of the CSI software that constitutes
Silvaco’s alleged trade secret, but Silvaco’s means
of creating that functionality through the source
code. 37
The appellate court affirmed on summary judgment, stating
that a defendant cannot “be liable for misappropriation of a trade
secret which is admittedly embodied in source code, based upon
the act of executing, on his own computer, executable code
allegedly tainted by the incorporation of design features

32

Id. at 218.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 217 (emphasis omitted).
36
Id. at 218.
37
Id. at 219.
33
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wrongfully derived from the plaintiff’s source code.” 38
The appellate court’s analysis relied primarily on two legal
determinations: (1) that one does not ordinarily use source code by
executing the object code compiled from the source code; and (2)
that one does not acquire the requisite knowledge of any trade
secrets embedded in the underlying source code by executing the
object code.39
A. What Information is a Trade Secret as it Pertains to Software
The first key issue decided by the appellate court was which of
Silvaco’s assets are protectable under the UTSA. It is undisputed
that the defendant only ever had access to compiled object code,
which is unreadable by humans. Therefore, the plaintiff, in order to
establish grounds for misappropriation liability, attempted to
define its trade secrets as “various features, functions, and
characteristics of the design and operation of . . . software,”40 as
well as a method for carrying out the functionality of its software.
Designs are not subject to trade secrecy protections. The
Silvaco court stated that a “design may constitute the basis for a
trade secret, such that information concerning it could be
actionably misappropriated; but it is the information—not the
design itself—that must form the basis for the cause of action.” 41
The court found that “the only trade secrets at issue are found in
Silvaco’s source code.”42 While “the finished (compiled) product
might have distinctive characteristics resulting from the design—
such as improved performance—they cannot constitute trade
secrets because they are not secret, but are evident to anyone
running the finished program.” 43 Thus, to establish improper use of
a trade secret embedded in software in California, a plaintiff must
establish use of the underlying source code.

38

Id. at 220.
Id. at 216.
40
Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 221.
41
Id. at 221-22 (emphasis omitted).
42
Id. at 222.
43
Id.
39
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B. What Constitutes Use of a Trade Secret When
Executing Software
The court in Silvaco looked to the UTSA drafters’ intention
and determined that their choice of the noun “use” was meant in
the ordinary sense. 44 The term commonly implies “if not direct
physical possession, at least a certain proximity or immediacy to
the thing used.” 45
For misappropriation by use, the UTSA requires that “at the
time of disclosure or use, [the defendant] knew or had reason to
know that his knowledge of the trade secret was acquired under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy.” 46 In
order to improperly use a trade secret, one must have knowledge of
the trade secret.
Knowledge of information requires possession of the
information. The court stated that “[t]o say that one ‘knows’ a fact
is also to say that one possesses information of that fact.”47 If the
disputed trade secret is source code, then in order to use the
information, one must possess the source code. Knowledge of the
trade secret does not require comprehension of the information to
claim misappropriation; 48 however, a proximity or immediacy to
the information is required.
C. Contrasting Silvaco with ClearOne
Although the facts of ClearOne Communications, Inc. v.
Chiang 49 are strikingly similar to those of Silvaco, the federal court
in Utah interpreted the UTSA to reach an opposite result. Applying
Utah’s enactment of the UTSA, the district court held that one may
be liable for misappropriation by executing object code. 50 In
ClearOne, a third party, WideBand, stole the plaintiff’s source
44

Id. at 223.
Id. at 223.
46
U.T.S.A. § 1(2)(B) (1985).
47
Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 226 (emphasis omitted).
48
ClearOne, 2007 WL 4376125 at *2.
49
Id.
50
Id.
45
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code with the aid of an ex-employee of ClearOne. WideBand
compiled the source code and licensed the resulting object code to
the defendant, Biamp. The plaintiff, ClearOne, obtained a
misappropriation judgment against WideBand and also claimed
that Biamp, by executing the object code, improperly used its trade
secrets.
In a brief footnote, the court declared ClearOne’s “proprietary
software” to be a trade secret. 51 The court deemed ClearOne’s
“computer code, computer code architecture . . . and algorithms” to
be trade secrets under the UTSA. 52 Under this analysis, the court
appears not to distinguish between information that communicates
a design and the design itself.
The court acknowledges the mental state requirement of the
defendant (knowledge of the trade secret). 53 However, in another
footnote, the court states that the statutory language is “generally
understood to reflect knowledge that the trade secret was derived
through improper means,” 54 as opposed to actual knowledge of the
information. The court cites a treatise to justify this understanding,
stating that liability will only attach “after having actual
knowledge or reason to know that the information was improperly
obtained.” 55
As a rebuttal to the plaintiff’s citing of ClearOne, the Silvaco
court states that “[t]he statute specifies required mental states with
respect to both the trade secret and the means by which it became
available to the defendant. To equate one of these requirements
with the other offends basic principles of statutory construction.” 56
In addition, the Silvaco court points out that the cited treatise has
been superseded and was likely quoted out of context. 57
The ClearOne court did not analyze the distinction between
source code and object code as information. From the language of
the opinion, one can infer the court’s view: if the source code is
51

Id at 2 n.2.
Id.
53
Id. at 2.
54
Id. at 2 n.3.
55
Id. at 2 n.3 (citing JAGER, Trade Secrets Law § 2:03) (emphasis omitted).
56
Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 228 (citing ClearOne, 2007 WL 4376125).
57
Id. at 227.
52
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eligible for protection, then the compiled object code is also a de
facto trade secret. In order to establish that object code is eligible
for protection, the court cites Data General Corp. v. Grumman
Systems. Support Corp. 58 In that case, a defendant was liable for
misappropriation when it loaded and ran the plaintiff’s object code.
Both the ClearOne and Data General courts relied on an older,
pre-UTSA opinion involving a plaintiff’s object code, Trandes
Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. 59 The Trandes Corp. court stated,
“An infringer may be liable for misappropriating trade secrets
when it loads and runs a computer program in its object code form,
even if the infringer never understands exactly how the program
works.”60 These cases hold that trade secret law protects object
code compiled from source code containing trade secrets. Because
both Data General and Trandes are pre-UTSA holdings these
opinions may not have been persuasive to the Silvaco court.
IV. POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS BEYOND SOFTWARE
Although Silvaco is a software case, its holding may be
significant for parties using other technologies that incorporate
trade secrets. The Silvaco opinion limits the liability of end users at
the expense of the rights and privileges of trade secret holders. The
ClearOne court espoused the opposite tradeoff. However, because
ClearOne’s analysis relied on pre-UTSA case law and did not
distinguish between information and designs, the Silvaco decision
is more consistent with the scope of the UTSA and its underlying
public policy rationales.
The Silvaco court limited the liability of those that use products
developed with another’s trade secrets. “ ‘[U]se’ in the ordinary
sense is not present when the conduct consists entirely of
possessing, and taking advantage of, something that was made

58

Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340
(D. Mass. 1993).
59
Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 798 F. Supp. 284 (D. Md. 1992).
60
See ClearOne, 2007 WL 4376125 at *3. See also Data General, 825 F.
Supp. at 359; Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 798 F. Supp. 284 (D. Md.
1992).
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using the secret.”61 The Silvaco court also stated, “[U]sing a
product does not constitute a ‘use’ of trade secrets employed in its
manufacture.” 62 These statements are not specific to software
technologies.
Public policy also justifies the application of Silvaco to other
industries. Many products in the stream of commerce involve
multiple layers of intellectual property and do not provide the end
user proper notice of the underlying rights. Even if producers had
incentives to disclose intellectual property used in the manufacture
of a product, consumers would experience an undue burden when
attempting to draw lines between proper and improper use.
This burden and potential liability would distort the supply and
demand curves for products. Even though Silvaco states this
principle in terms of software, the result is applicable to many
industries. If the act of running completed software “constituted a
use of the source code from which it was compiled, then every
purchaser of software would be exposed to liability if it were latter
alleged that the software was based in part upon purloined source
code. This risk could be expected to inhibit . . . sales and
discourage innovation.” 63
The Silvaco court’s use of a familiar analogy demonstrates the
potential application of its holding to products beyond software.64
In this analogy, a pie recipe represents the trade secret (which, in
Silvaco, was the source code) and the baked pie represents the
finished product (object code). A person “who bakes a pie from a
recipe certainly engages in the ‘use’ of the latter; but one who eats
the pie does not, by virtue of that act alone, make ‘use’ of the
recipe in an ordinary sense, and this is true even if the baker is
accused of stealing the recipe from a competitor, and the diners
know this acquisition.” 65 In the same fashion, a person who uses
an end product that incorporates trade secrets should not be subject
to liability for that use alone.

61

Silvaco, 184 Cal. App. 4th at 224 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
63
Id. (emphasis omitted)
64
See id.
65
Id.
62
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CONCLUSION
The California Court of Appeals in Silvaco expressly held that
the execution of binary object code is not an improper use of any
trade secrets embedded in the underlying source code. This holding
releases end users of compiled software obtained in good faith
from claims of misappropriation.
Although Silvaco directly contradicts ClearOne, another UTSA
case, the holding in Silvaco is more consistent with the UTSA. By
extending protection to the execution of object code, the ClearOne
court appears to extend trade secret status to designs and
functionality, which are not within the scope of the UTSA. In
addition, the ClearOne court seems to rely on pre-UTSA case law
to arrive at this holding.
The Silvaco holding is not limited to the software industry.
Because of the public policies at stake, an unknowing end user of a
product is not liable for the improper use of the trade secrets used
to produce a product.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Educate clients about the risks associated with acquiring
technology that might have third party intellectual property
embedded in the technology. Advise clients that one
strategy to minimize such risks is to require the vendor to
provide IP infringement indemnities.



Advise clients that any executable software the client
procures from another party may contain the trade secrets
of other parties. Depending upon the relevant state,
executing that software may give rise to liability for the
misappropriation of trade secrets.



If a client suspects a piece of executable software to contain
the trade secrets of someone other than the party from
whom it obtained the software, the client may wish to run
the software on servers physically located in the state of
California.



If a client suspects its source code was embedded in
another party’s object code and is attempting to enforce its
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rights under the UTSA, the client may wish to attempt to
bring suit in the state of Utah.


If a client embeds trade secrets in its source code, the client
should treat both the source code and the compiled object
code as trade secrets. Any licensing of these assets should
include non-disclosure agreements to maintain secrecy.

